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1Abstract
It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously
to avoid ineﬃciency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss
issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive
results: either parties have diﬀerent preferences over agendas or they are indiﬀerent.
We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over
agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue ￿rst. Moreover,
when an issue is diﬃcult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this
issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone
the negotiations over the diﬃcult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that
players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since
t h e s ea r eo f t e ni nc o n ￿ict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular
interest.
21 Introduction
The problem of forming an agenda, which states the order in which parties should
discuss issues, is of interest, since diﬀerent agendas can lead to diﬀerent outcomes.
If in a peace process diﬃcult issues were postponed then diﬀerent outcomes could
be imagined; if a buyer and a seller could agree over the price of valuable items ￿rst
then the outcome of the bargaining can be expected to be diﬀerent from the results
of negotiations in which the initial items bargained over are the least valuable. The
agenda formation problem is relatively new, despite the fact the amount of economic
activity intermediated every year by negotiated agreement is very large and that the
literature on bargaining is already well developed (extensive reviews are in Muthoo,
1999, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990 and Ray and Vohra, 1997).
It has been argued that a simultaneous procedure (in which all the issues are
discussed at the same time) should be the prevailing phenomenon, since it both saves
time and makes full use of all valuable trading opportunities across issues (Inderst,
2000, Busch and Horstmann, 1997, Weinberger, 2000). This does not seem to have
a strong support in practice, where parties bargain over issues sequentially (e.g.,
departmental meetings, ￿rm-union bargaining, buy-and-sell processes, etc.), partially
because the parties cannot deal with many issues at the same time. A key question
is then when parties bargain sequentially over issues which issue should they discuss
3￿rst?
This question seems simple, however it is unanswered and has not received much
formal attention from a game theoretical perspective. We focus on very simple frame-
works with complete and perfect information in which players attempt to divide each
surplus (or cake) as in the standard alternating oﬀer bargaining model (Rubinstein,
1982). Before describing in more details the features of our model, we de￿ne the key
aspects of a multi-issue bargaining procedure. First of all, when parties can bargain
over more than one issue, the agreements may be implemented as soon as they are
reached (sequential implementation) or only after all the issues have been settled (si-
multaneous implementation). As in Busch and Horstmann (1997, 1999) and Inderst
(2000), we assume that the implementation is sequential. This assumption is consis-
tent with a large number of cases (for instance, departmental meetings or a buyer
and a seller bargaining over the price of diﬀerent items)1.
One of the key assumptions in our model is that after reaching an agreement over
an issue there is an interval of time before players attempt to reach an agreement
over another item2. For instance, after agreeing over the price of an item the buyer
can walk out of the shop and after a certain period of time he will be back to start
bargaining over the price of another item (or alternatively, there is an interval of time
1For an analysis of agenda formation with complete information under simultaneous implemen-
tation see Fershtman (1990), Lang and Rosenthal (2001) and Weinberger (2000).
2Our framework also supports alternative interpretations (see discussion in section 2).
4to search for another item over which to bargain); in departmental meetings after
completing the discussion on an item, parties gather the material for the discussion
of the next item. We show that this assumption is relevant in driving our results on
the best agenda. As Muthoo (1995b) pointed out, in general, not only this interval
exists but it is often larger than the interval of time between a rejection and a new
proposal.
The main message of our analysis is that players need to take into account many
strategic eﬀects in forming their preferences over agendas, and although these can be
in con￿ict, a Pareto optimal agenda can exist. The best agenda requires discussing
the most important issue ￿rst (Proposition 3 focuses on the common assumption of
players with exactly the same preferences on issues, while Proposition 4 generalises
the result to players with similar valuations of the issues). This result is new in the
literature which uses game theoretical models similar to ours (a description of this
literature is below). Only Winter (1997) shows a result similar to ours but in a very
diﬀerent framework (players are required to have semi-lexicographic preferences and
moreover, there is no timing). This result appears intuitive but it is not obvious. We
highlight the diﬀerent incentives that players have in forming their preferences over
agendas. These include 1) a player￿s incentive to discuss his more important issue
￿rst 2) to postpone the bargaining over the opponent￿s more important issue and
3) to be ￿rst mover when bargaining over his more important cake. Clearly, these
5incentives can be in con￿ict and this is why the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda
is particularly interesting.
The models closer to ours are Busch and Horstmann (1997, 1999) and Inderst
(2000). The most signi￿cant diﬀerences are the following. First of all their focus is
diﬀerent. The former compare a simultaneous with a sequential procedure, while the
latter fully endogenise the agenda selection problem. We restrict our analysis to se-
quential procedures. Diﬀerently from Busch and Horstmann (1997, 1999) and Inderst
(2000), we are able to de￿ne the Pareto optimal agenda among sequential procedures.
Moreover, their focus is on the case in which all the frictions are represented by a
common discount factor, δ, which vanishes, δ → 1 (and in Busch and Horstmann,
1997, 1999, players have speci￿c valuations of the importance of an issue). We allow
players to diﬀer in their valuation of the cakes and their time preferences. We believe
that these diﬀerences may be important in real-life negotiations and they should be
taken into account. Indeed, we show that when these diﬀerences are not allowed,
the interplay of the forces in the bargaining process is strongly modi￿ed. Finally,
as already noted above, Muthoo (1995b) considered the possibility of an interval of
time between diﬀerent bargaining stages. However, since his main aim was to anal-
yse repeated games, an in￿nite number of identical cakes are to be shared. In our
framework, where the main focus is the agenda formation problem, a ￿nite number
of heterogeneous cakes are considered.
6In the case in which a Pareto optimal agenda does exist, one can easily think of
a procedure in which players select that agenda. However, when players￿ preferences
over agendas con￿ict, the agenda selection is relevant. Accordingly, we consider a
number of pre-games not only to solve the problem of how players select an agenda,
but also to highlight diﬀerent characteristics of the following bargaining process.
Finally, the paper focuses on negotiations with a diﬃcult/urgent issue. An issue is
diﬃcult (but not necessarily the most important) if a rejection of a proposal regarding
such an issue can compromise future negotiations. The diﬃcult issue can also be
interpreted as urgent, in the sense that players discount more strongly utilities derived
from a delayed agreement on that issue. We show that when there is a diﬃcult/urgent
issue, the Pareto superior agenda consists in postponing such an issue. This is in
accordance with the common observation that the chance of successfully bargaining
over a diﬃcult issue is higher when the ￿rst issue is easier to negotiate. For example,
in Winter (1997), p. 340: Israel and Palestinians are better oﬀ ￿when the Jerusalem
issue is pushed down to the bottom of the agenda [since it] is without doubt the
most emotionally loaded issue and perhaps the most diﬃcult one￿. However, we
show that the driving force in our framework is quite diﬀerent. Players need to
postpone the diﬃcult issue regardless of its importance to avoid compromising future
negotiations. This explains why, in ￿rm-union negotiations, the level of employment
is often discussed before anything else.
7The paper is organised as follows: in the next section the main model is presented.
This is solved and analysed in section 2.1. We then focus on the agenda formation
problem (section 3). First, we show that in spite of the complex interplay of the
forces in the bargaining model, players may have the same preferences over agendas
(section 3.1). Then, by the means of pre-games, we tackle the agenda selection
problem (section 3.2). Finally, players￿ preferences over agendas are derived for the
case of a diﬃcult/urgent issue (section 4). Some ￿nal remarks conclude the paper in
section 5.
2 A Two-Player Two-Cake Bargaining Game
We model the agenda formation problem as a two-stage bargaining game. Two play-
e r s ,1a n d2 ,n e g o t i a t eo v e rt h ep a r t i t i o no ft w oc a k e s ,n a m e d1a n d2 ,a sw e l l .A te a c h
stage, players negotiate over the division of a cake according to an alternating-oﬀer
procedure as in the classic Rubinstein bargaining model (Rubinstein, 1982, henceforth
RBM). Players can start the negotiations over the second cake only after reaching
an agreement on the ￿rst cake (a sequential bargaining protocol). A time period is
indicated by t,w i t ht =0 ,1,2.... However, periods can take diﬀerent lengths of time.
In particular, between a rejection and a new proposal (within a bargaining stage), an
interval of time ∆ passes, while between an acceptance and a new proposal (between
bargaining stages) an interval of time τ passes. For instance, a buyer walks out of the
8shop after buying an item, and only after a certain period of time he is back in the
shop to start the negotiations over the price of another item. To take these diﬀerences
into account, player i￿s time preferences are represented by his within-cake discount
factor δi =e x p ( −ri∆), which applies after a rejection and his between-cake discount
factor αi =e x p ( −riτ), which applies after an acceptance, where ri is player i￿s dis-
count rate, with i =1 ,2. As we said above, Muthoo (1995b) ￿rstly introduced these
parameters in a two-person alternating-oﬀer bargaining model in which an in￿nite
number of cakes (of constant size) are to be shared.
Since each cake represents an issue over which players attempt to ￿nd an agree-
ment, we allow players to diﬀer in their cake valuations. A non-negative parameter λi
represents not only the relative importance of cake i to player i but also the relative
importance of cake i between the players (see payoﬀ functions below), with i =1 ,2.
Player 1 is assumed to be the ￿rst mover at the beginning of the game (t =0 ),
while a successful proposer at the ￿rst stage becomes a responder at the beginning
of the second stage. The switch of players￿ roles at the second stage is not crucial
in the sense that the following analysis is robust to the case in which either the ￿rst
mover at second stage is randomly selected or the role of the players is ￿xed and
independent of the sequence of moves at the ￿rst stage. The only case we need to
exclude, because trivial, is the one in which the ￿rst mover at the second stage is
assumed to be the proposer who made a successful proposer at the ￿rst stage. This
9case would be as if the bargaining were on a larger cake, which is the sum of the two.
Consequently, a successful proposer would demand the Rubinsteinian share over all
the cakes.
The implementation of the agreement is assumed to be sequential, in other words,
delays in the agreement over the division of the ￿rst cake aﬀect the second stage, while
subsequent delays in the agreement over the second cake do not aﬀect the partition
agreed in the ￿rst stage. For example, if a buyer and a seller agree over the price of
an item, the agreement can be implemented immediately, subsequently parties can
start to bargain over the price of another item.
If an agreement is not reached on the partition of a cake, players get zero payoﬀs
(disagreement) at that stage. Then, if disagreement takes place at the ￿rst stage the
second stage cannot take place and players￿ overall payoﬀ is zero. In our framework
we consider two agendas, agenda i states that cake i is negotiated ￿rst, with i =1 ,2.
In this section we focus on agenda 1.I f ,a f t e rt rounds, an agreement is reached on
the division of the ￿rst cake, (x,1−x), where x is the share player 1 obtains, and after
n +1p e r i o d s( ap e r i o do fl e n g t hτ and n periods of length ∆) another agreement is





1α1(1 − y)) (1)
v2 = δ
t
2(1 − z + δ
n
2α2λ2y) (2)
10In this model player i￿s valuation of the second game stage has two dimensions,
namely, αi, the between-cake discount factor, and, λi, the relative valuation of the
cake size. When cake i is valued equally by the players, then λi is equal to 1. This
implies that there is at least one player (player i) who has a similar valuation of the
two cakes. This is not a limiting restriction, since the relative valuations of the cake,
rather than the absolute values, is what matters.
As pointed out in footnote 2, the parameter αi has two alternative interpreta-
tions. First, suppose that after an agreement there is no time lapse and parties are
able to start immediately the negotiations over the second cake. However, player i
perceives that there is a probability of game breakdown after the ￿rst agreement αi,
with i =1 ,2. The probability of game continuation represents all the exogenous fric-
tions and diﬃculties that can impede the bargaining over a new issue. Players may
have a diﬀerent probability of game continuation αi, not because they have diﬀerent
information, but because they may have diﬀerent perceptions of the ￿rules￿ of the
game in a given situation (Muthoo, 1995a, where the common prior assumption does
not hold). Alternatively, we can also think of αi, as a rescaling factor representing
player i￿s optimism. If we assume that this perception/characteristic is constant and
exogenously given, then the framework described in this section can also represent
these cases.
112.1 The Equilibrium
The focus is on subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). The second stage is simply the RBM
w h e r ep l a y e r sm a yh a v ed i ﬀerent valuations of the cake (in general, λ2 6=1 ). Then,
in spite of the diﬀerences in players valuations of the size of cake 2, the equilibrium
partition is as in the RBM (player i0sd e m a n d si s( 1−δj)/(1−δiδj) with i,j =1 ,2 and
i 6= j). This independence is due to the multiplicative form of the model (the relative
importance ratio λi multiplied the share obtained), however, it is not problematic,
since what matters is the overall payoﬀ and this is dependent on both λi￿s. In the
following, the SPE strategies are stated ￿rst for the case of a positive interval of time
between an acceptance and a new proposal (proposition 1), then for the limit case of
∆ which tends to zero (corollary 1).
Proposition 1 If λi > 0 and vi > 0,w i t hi =1 ,2,w h e r evi is de￿ned in (5) and
(6) below, there is a unique SPE in which the agreement is reached immediately over
the partition of every single cake. At the ￿rst stage the equilibrium demand of player
1 (2)i sx1 (y2, respectively), as de￿ned in (3) and (4) below. At the second stage,
parties play the RBM.
x1 =
(1 − δ2)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ1)(α2λ1λ2(1 + δ2) − δ2α1(1 + δ1)]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (3)
y2 =
(1 − δ1)[(1 − δ1δ2)λ1 +( 1− δ2)(α1(1 + δ1) − α2λ1λ2δ1(1 + δ2)]
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)2 (4)
12The equilibrium payoﬀ to player i is given by vi for i =1 ,2 de￿ned as follows:
v1 =
1 − δ2




[(1 − δ1δ2)(λ1 + α1)+( δ1 − δ2)(α1 − α2λ1λ2)] (6)
Proof. The solution is based on the usual indiﬀerence conditions between accept-
i n ga n dr e j e c t i o na no ﬀer. The reasoning to show the subgame perfection and the
uniqueness is standard (for instance, Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990).
Corollary 1 Under the conditions speci￿ed in Proposition 1,i nt h el i m i ta s∆ tends
to zero, there is a unique SPE in which the agreement is reached immediately over the
partition of every single cake. At the second stage, players demand half of the cake,
while in the ￿rst stage the SPE demands are de￿ned below,
x1 =
r2[(r1 + r2)λ1 +2 r1(α2λ1λ2 − α1)]
λ1(r1 + r2)2 (7)
y2 =
r1[(r1 + r2)λ1 +2 r2(α1 − α2λ1λ2)]
λ1(r1 + r2)2 (8)
Then, equilibrium payoﬀsa r e ,
v1 =
r2




[(r1 + r2)λ1 + α2λ1λ2(r1 − r2)+2 α1r2] (10)
13The equilibrium speci￿ed above has interesting characteristics. First of all, play-
ers￿ demands in equilibrium are complicated functions of the parameters of the model
and typical results obtained in the context of bargaining over a single cake, such as the
￿rst mover advantage, (v1 >v 2), may not exist in this game. Moreover, an important
feature of the bargaining process is represented by the product (α1−α2λ1λ2)(δ1−δ2)
(see also corollary 1, with reference to r1−r2) which characterised both players￿ payoﬀ
functions in equilibrium, see (5) and (6). If parties have the same within-cake dis-
count factor, δ1 = δ2, which is a common assumption in the literature, the interplay of
the forces in the bargaining process is greatly simpli￿ed. As a result player i￿s payoﬀ
does not depend on αi. Moreover, player 2￿s payoﬀ is also independent of his relative
valuation of cake 2 (λ2). This aspect of the bargaining process will have a strong
impact on the agenda formation problem. To see the eﬀects of the common discount
factor assumption, let￿s consider the case in which the product (α1−α2λ1λ2)(δ1−δ2)
diﬀers from zero - although, the payoﬀs vi are positive. In particular, player 1 is
the more patient player and he has a higher valuation of the future bargaining, (i.e.,
α1/λ1 >α 2λ2), then both parties are better oﬀ. The intuition is that when the
second stage matters to a player, he will make concessions over the ￿rst bargaining
stage to pass to the second. However, if he is impatient he will make concessions
which are too large, since he would like to avoid any rejection. If he is relatively
patient then his concessions are not as large and he is better oﬀ. On the other hand,
14a relatively impatient rival, who does not mind about the future, is advantaged by
these concessions.
Finally, in general the feasibility conditions, that is, vi > 0 with i =1 ,2, speci￿ed
in (5) and (6), are satis￿ed. In particular when the factors (α1−α2λ1λ2) and (δ1−δ2)
have either the same sign or one is null, the feasibility conditions are always satis￿ed,
while when these factors have the opposite sign, in some speci￿c cases restrictions
need to be imposed to have positive payoﬀs vi,w i t hi =1 ,2.F o ri n s t a n c e ,s u p p o s e
that player 1 is more patient than player 2 (δ1 >δ 2), moreover, player 1 considers the
future bargaining stage suﬃciently more important than his rival (i.e., α1/λ1 <α 2λ2).
In this case, player 1￿s payoﬀ v1,d e ￿ned in (5), is positive, while player 2￿s payoﬀ v2,
de￿n e di n( 6 ) ,i sp o s i t i v eo n l yw h e na>δ 2b where a = α1+λ1− δ1(α2λ1λ2− α1) and
b = δ1(α1 + λ1)− (α2λ1λ2− α1). This inequality is always satis￿ed regardless of the
sign of a and b, except in one case, that is, when both a and b a r en e g a t i v e( w h i c h
exists only if 2α1 < (α2λ2 − 1)λ1). In this particular case, players discount factors
need to be suﬃciently close, that is, δ1 >δ 2 >a / b , to ensure a positive payoﬀs v2.I n
the special cases in which the feasibility conditions are not satis￿ed, the equilibrium
described in Proposition 1 either does not exist (when vi < 0) or is not unique (when
vi =0 ). There are equilibria characterised by corner solutions (shares x1 and y2 such
that the overall payoﬀ for a player is zero) and, possibly, delays. Since these equilibria
arise for speci￿c values of the parameters of the model, in the following we focus only
15on interior solutions (share x1 and y2, such that the payoﬀsd e ￿n e di n( 5 )a n d( 6 )a r e
positive).
Before discussing the agenda formation problem, a note on another extreme case.
When a player does not care about an issue, the SPE can be ineﬃcient as shown in
the following remark.
Remark 2 If λ1 =0(and λ2 is ￿nite), there is an ineﬃcient SPE with a delay.
Player 1 induces a rejection at t =0 .A t t =1 ,p l a y e r2 asks for the entire cake,
player 1 accepts this and at the second stage they divide cake 2 as in the RBM.
Proof. If λ1 =0 ,p l a y e r1 does not mind about the division of the ￿rst cake. More-
over, player 1 is indiﬀerent between dividing the ￿rst cake immediately or inducing a
rejection. A rejection will take place if player 1 asks for a share x1 larger than
(1 − δ2)(1 + α2λ2(1 − δ1)(1 + δ2))/(1 − δ1δ2) (11)
However, with or without rejection, player 1 gets the same payoﬀ, α1δ1(1 − δ2)/(1 −
δ1δ2),w h i l ep l a y e r2i sw o r s eo ﬀ when there is a rejection,
1+λ2α2δ2(1 − δ1)/(1 − δ1δ2) <δ 2(1 + λ2α2δ2(1 − δ1)/(1 − δ1δ2)) (12)
If the parameter λ2 is in￿nite, then no delay can take place, since player 2 accepts
any oﬀer at the ￿rst round.
In conclusion, in our framework, SPE with delay can exist, although they are
Pareto dominated. Usually, in bargaining theory, SPE with delay under complete
16information are regarded as interesting, since they represent ineﬃciencies even in
simple set ups. However, the delay obtained in this framework is mainly a technical
result which depends on the speci￿c values that the parameters of the model assume.
For this reason, in the following sections we only focus on the SPE without delay.
3 Agenda Formation Problem
In this section ￿rst we focus on SPE under agenda 2, that states that cake 2 is shared
￿rst. We then de￿ne under which conditions players prefer the same agenda. We
show that a Pareto optimal agenda exists, however the subtle strategic eﬀects that
players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas, are often
con￿icting.
The SPE under agenda 2 is similar to the one de￿ned for agenda 1, in particular,
since the order of the cakes is reversed, the shares demanded on the ￿rst cake under
agenda 2 is as x1 and y2 in (3) and (4), where the parameter λi is substituted by 1/λi
(with λi > 0). Then, the SPE payoﬀs under agenda 2, ui with i =1 ,2 are as follows:
u1 =
1 − δ2
λ2(1 − δ1δ2)2[(λ2 + α2)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α2 − α1λ1λ2)(δ2 − δ1)] (13)
u2 =
δ2(1 − δ1)
(1 − δ1δ2)2[λ2(1 + α1λ1)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α2 − α1λ1λ2)(δ2 − δ1)] (14)
As for agenda 1, under the assumption of a common discount factor, the bargain-
i n gp r o c e s si ss t r o n g l ys i m p l i ￿ed, since the product (α2 − α1λ1λ2)(δ2 − δ1) in the
17payoﬀ functions (13) and (14) is zero. We allow players to have diﬀerent discount
factors, as long as the feasibility conditions, ui > 0,a r es a t i s ￿ed3.
3.1 The Pareto Optimal Agenda
Whenever the diﬀerences in player i￿s payoﬀs vi − ui, with i =1 ,2, have the same
s i g n ,p l a y e r sp r e f e rt h es a m ea g e n d a .M o r ep r e c i s e l y ,a g e n d a1 is preferred by player






2 −1)(1+δ2)α2(1−δ1)+λ2(λ1 −1)(1−δ1δ2 +α1(δ2 −δ1))] (15)






1λ2)(1+δ1)α1(1−δ2)+λ1(1−λ2)(1−δ1δ2 +α2(δ1 −δ2))] (16)
The main results are presented in the following propositions. In Proposition 3,
we consider a common case in the literature, that is, players have exactly the same
valuations of the issues. Diﬀerently from this literature, we derive a new result. That
is, a Pareto optimal agenda exists. This is then generalised in proposition 4.
3In general the feasibility conditions will be satis￿ed without any restrictions on players discount
factors. For a discussion see section 2.1 above.
18Proposition 3 If players have exactly the same valuation of the issues and one issue
is the most important (i.e., λ1 =1 /λ2 6=1 ), then they prefer to discuss such an issue
￿rst.
Proof. If λ1 =1 /λ2, then (15), respectively (16), can be written as follows:
(1 − δ2)(1 − λ2)[(1 − α2)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α1 − α2)(δ2 − δ1)]
(1 − δ1δ2)2λ2
(17)
δ2(1 − δ1)(λ1 − 1)[(1 − α1)(1 − δ1δ2)+( α1 − α2)(δ2 − δ1)]
(1 − δ1δ2)2λ1
(18)
When there is consensus over the importance of the issues (for instance, cake
1 represents the most important issue, λ1 =1 /λ2 > 1), the expressions (17) and
(18) have the same sign (in this example, positive). Note that if either there are no
frictions after an acceptance (i.e., αi =1for any i) or all the frictions are represented
by a common discount factor (δi = αj = δ for i,j =1 ,2) which vanishes (δ → 1),
players are indiﬀerent between agendas.
Proposition 3 establishes an intuitive result on the eﬃciency of sequential proce-
dures. When there is an important issue, this should be discussed ￿rst. However, this
result is new in the literature which uses game theoretical models similar to ours (for
instance, Busch and Horstmann, 1997, 1999, and Inderst, 2000)4. An important fea-
ture of your model is that players have not only a within-cake but also a between-cake
discount factor. In other words, as soon as a proposal is accepted, players cannot start
4Only Winter (1997) ￿nds a similar result, but the framework is completely diﬀerent (fundamen-
tals are preferences and these are required to be semi-lexicographic, moreover there is no timing).
19bargaining immediately, but only after some time. Often it is assumed that either
there is no interval of time between an acceptance and a new proposal (αi =1 ), or the
interval of time has the same length as the interval of time between a rejection and a
new proposal (δi = αj = δ for i,j =1 ,2) and since the frictions vanish (δ → 1), this
interval tends to zero (see, Busch and Horstmann, 1997, 1999, and Inderst, 2000). It
is straightforward to show that in this case Proposition 3 cannot be established (see
proof of Proposition 3). In particular, players are indiﬀerent between procedures.
However, it is reasonable to assume that in general during negotiations the interval
of time between a rejection and a new proposal (∆)i sd i ﬀerent from the interval of
time between an acceptance and a new proposal (τ) and as Muthoo (1995b) pointed
out, the former is often smaller than the latter (∆ <τ).
The result shown in Proposition 3 is now extended to the case of players with
diﬀerent valuations of the issues. In this case, the length of the interval of time
between an acceptance and a new proposal plays a more explicit role as shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 If there is an important issue and the αi of one player is suﬃciently
small, then it is Pareto optimal to discuss the most important issue ￿rst.
Proof. Given the result in Proposition 3, we focus on the case in which players
do not have exactly the same valuations of the issues (λ1 6=1 /λ2), although both
prefer the same cake, say 1 (i.e., λ1 > 1 and λ2 < 1). With a similar reasoning,
20it can be shown that players prefer to postpone the negotiations over cake 1, if
this represents the less important issue. The ￿rst terms in squared bracket in (15)
and (16) cannot be both positive simultaneously (for instance, if λ1λ
2
2 > 1,t h e n
λ
2
1λ2 > 1). However, they can be either both negative or one term is negative while
the other is positive (we omit the proof for the cases of a null term, since this is
straightforward). Suppose that one term is negative while the other is positive, in
particular, λ1 > 1/λ
2
2 > 1,t h e ni fα1 <α 1 =
(1−λ2)λ1(1−δ1δ2+α2(δ1−δ2))
(λ2
1λ2−1)(1+δ1)(1−δ2) , agenda 1 is
Pareto optimal. Alternatively, if λ
2
1λ2 < 1 (which implies λ1λ
2
2 < 1), then agenda
1i sP a r e t oo p t i m a lf o rα2 <α 2 =
(λ1−1)λ2(1−δ1δ2+α1(δ2−δ1))
(1−λ1λ2
2)(1+δ2)(1−δ1) . Finally, we show that if
both ￿rst terms in (15) and (16) are negative, in other words, both players strongly
prefer cake 1 (that is, λ1 is suﬃciently larger than 1 while λ2 is suﬃciently smaller
so that λ
2
1λ2 > 1 but λ1λ
2
2 < 1), only one player￿s between-cake discount factors is
required to be suﬃciently small. To show this, we focus on (15) ￿rst. For any value
of α1 in [0,1], expression (15) is positive if α2 is close to zero (since λ1 is larger than
1). Moreover, expression (15) is decreasing in α2 (since λ1λ
2
2 < 1). This implies that
for α2 suﬃciently large, (15) is negative (although this may requires a value of α2
larger than 1). The same reasoning holds for (16) with αi replaced with αj with
i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. Then, to conclude the proof we need to show that when both
α1 and α2 are large, (15) and (16) cannot be both negative. Since these expressions
are both monotonic, let both αi be equal to 1, with i =1 ,2. In this case, (15) and
21(16), respectively, can be written as follows.
(1 − δ2)(1 + δ1)(1 + λ1)(1 − λ1λ2)
(1 − δ1δ2)2λ2
(19)
(1 − δ1)(1 + δ2)(1 + λ2)(λ1λ2 − 1)
(1 − δ1δ2)2λ2
(20)
These expressions never have the same sign when there is an important issue
(λi 6=1for any i), since λ1 6=1 /λ2 (for the case of λ1 =1 /λ2, see Proposition 3).
This implies that only one constraint αi <α i has to be binding to obtain consensus
over the importance of the agendas. Moreover, players never agree in postponing an
important issue (if αi >α i player have diﬀerent preferences over agendas).
Since the constraint over the parameter αi stated in Proposition 4 depends on
the parameters λi,w i t hi =1 ,2, agreement over agendas can also take place when
the between-cake discount factor αi is large, although it has to be smaller than 1
for a player. This implies that to establish consensus over the best agenda, a player
is required to focus only on the ￿rst stage. What characterises such a player is a
h i g hv a l u a t i o no fa ni s s u e( s e ep r o o fa b o v e ) .T ou n d e r s t a n dt h i sr e s u l t ,w en e e dt o
recall the strategic eﬀect represented by a positive product (α1 − α2λ1λ2)(δ1 − δ2)
in players￿ equilibrium payoﬀs. In particular, large concessions are made over the
division of an initial cake, when the future matters (if α1/λ1 >α 2λ2 with δ1 >δ 2,
then player 1 makes large concessions over the division of cake 1 under agenda 1).
Then, the responder (in this case player 2) may prefer to postpone the important
issue if this implies large concessions from his opponent. That is why the player who
22minds relatively more about an initial issue is required to have a small between-cake
discount factor. This result can be shown in a more transparent manner by focusing
on the limit case of ∆ which tends to zero, that is, the interval between an acceptance
and a new proposal vanishes.
Corollary 2 In the limit, as ∆ → 0, if there is consensus over the importance of
the issues and the αi of one player is suﬃciently small, then it is Pareto optimal to
discuss the most important issue ￿rst.
Proof. Since when ∆ → 0, exp(−ri∆) can be approximated by 1−ri∆, at the limit










1λ2)+λ1(1 − λ2)(r1 + r2 + α2(r2 − r1))] (22)
Then, the proof follows the same reasoning as in the Proposition 4.
In this case, when player 1 minds very much about cake 1 (i.e., λ1 > 1/λ
2
2 > 1), he
is required to have a relatively low between-cake discount factor (otherwise, player
2 prefers agenda 2, i.e., (22) is negative). Finally, by using the limit case of ∆ that
tends to zero (see (21) and (22)), it is straightforward to show that when players
do not agree over the importance of the issue, they have opposite preferences over
agendas. Diﬀerently from Fershtman (1990), where the agenda plays no role for
23players in￿nitely patient, in our framework Proposition 4 still holds.
The remaining part of this section highlights some strategic eﬀects that arise in
the agenda formation framework. In particular, we show that players need to take
into account many incentives in choosing the best agenda and these can be in con￿ict.
This makes the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda of particular interest. Firstly,
when players have the same valuation of the cakes size, λ1 = λ2 =1 ,t h e ya r e
indiﬀerent between the two agendas, however, when only one player considers the
issues equally important, he prefers the agenda that puts the issue most important to
his rival at the bottom of the list. The reason is that the rival will concede a higher
share on the ￿rst cake to pass to negotiations over the second one. As expected,
the rival prefers the agenda that puts his most important issue ￿rst so that fewer
concessions are made. Players￿ disagreement over the best agenda is even stronger,
when they have opposite valuation of the cakes￿ size, λ1 = λ2 6=1 .
Moreover, a player prefers to discuss his more important issue also because the
between-cake discount factor decreases the utility obtained by the division of the
second cake. For the purpose of the argument, let￿s assume that the between-cake
discount factor is a rescaling factor which represents players￿ optimism. Then, even
though a player, say 1,b e c o m e si n ￿nitely patient (δ1 → 1)h i so p t i m i s mc a nb e
assumed to be strictly smaller than 1.I nt h i sc a s e ,p l a y e r1 is the only one to rank
agendas, while his rival is indiﬀerent. Player 1 prefers to discuss his more important
24issue ￿rst (he prefers agenda 1 if and only if λ1 > 1 and agenda 2 if and only if λ1 < 1).
The reason is that player 1 always gets the whole cake, however since the optimism
makes the cake discussed second smaller, he prefers to put his more important issue
at the top of the list, while his rival is indiﬀerent between agendas, since he always
gets zero.
Finally, the expression (16) can be positive even when λ2 > 1.T h a ti s ,λ1 is suﬃ-
ciently small. In this case, player 2 prefers agenda 1 even though his more important
issue is represented by cake 2. The reason is that he enjoys not only the concessions
made by player 1 at the ￿rst stage but also a ￿rst mover advantage at the second
stage.
In conclusion, in this section three main strategic eﬀects have been pointed out:
o n ei sap l a y e r ￿ si n c e n t i v et od i s c u s st h em o r ei m p o r t a n ti s s u e￿rst; another is the pref-
erence to be a ￿rst mover over the most important cake; ￿nally, there is an incentive
to postpone bargaining over the rival￿s more important issue. These incentives can
be in con￿ict in determining players￿ preferences over agendas, however, as shown
in Proposition 3, 4, and Corollary 2, the best agenda can be established. This is
in contrast to otherwise similar frameworks adopted in the literature, which do not
distinguish between diﬀerent discount factors.
253.2 Agenda Pre-Games
Since in our framework a Pareto optimal agenda can exists, the problem of selecting
an agenda is not crucial in the sense that players will select the best agenda when
this exists. The agenda selection problem is more relevant when players have diﬀerent
preferences over agendas (for instance due to diﬀerent valuations of the importance
of the issues). In this section, we solve the agenda selection problem by means of
a pre-game, that is a procedure which precedes the two-stage bargaining model, in
which players choose an agenda, then they will bargain according to the agenda
selected. Given the structure of the model, a solution of a pre-game allows us to
highlight diﬀerent features of the following bargaining game. We consider two pre-
games the ￿rst one is one-shot, (in its ￿soft￿ and ￿tough￿ version), while the ￿nal one
is an in￿nitely repeated game.
In the ￿rst pre-game, called soft, players are assumed to choose simultaneously an
agenda. If the same agenda is chosen, then the bargaining game takes place under this
agenda, if not, players toss a coin (not necessarily fair), and with probability 0 <p<1
(respectively 1−p) agenda 1 (2) is selected. Then, the Nash equilibrium (NE) of this
game depends strongly on the analysis of the best agenda, presented in section 3.1,
as it is based on the sign of the diﬀerences v1 −u1 and v2 −u2.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i ft h e r e
is a Pareto superior agenda, players choose it in equilibrium. However, if there is not
(for instance because there is no consensus over the importance of the issues) then
26players have diﬀerent dominant strategies and in the unique NE they choose diﬀerent
agendas. In other words, the best players can do is to state their best agenda and
toss a coin, regardless of whether it is fair or not, as long as p is diﬀerent from 0 and
1 ( s oa st oa v o i dm u l t i p l eS P E ) .
The soft one-shot game can be solved by the analysis of the Pareto optimal agenda.
However, if players are assumed to get zero payoﬀs when they do not choose the same
agendas (tough version), the game is strongly modi￿ed. In this case, there are two
NE in pure strategies, as long as the payoﬀs vi and ui are positive. Either agenda 1
or agenda 2 is selected. Moreover, there is a unique NE in mixed strategies. Players￿
NE randomisation is of interest in highlighting some characteristics of the following
bargaining process. When players have the same discount factor δ, their equilibrium
randomisation strategies is independent of δ,e v e nt h o u g hp l a y e r s ￿p a y o ﬀs under the
two agendas depend on δ. This is due to an equilibrium consideration: players are
made indiﬀerent among agendas, in an SPE in mixed strategies. Moreover, (with
δi = δ) if player 1 becomes more optimistic, α1 increases, player 2￿s payoﬀsi n c r e a s e s
in both agendas. However, the increase in agenda 2 is higher, player 1 will make larger
concessions, if λ1 is larger than 1. Then, the probability player 1 attaches to agenda
1 in equilibrium increases if cake 1 represents his most important issue (λ1 > 1).
The ￿nal pre-game we consider is an alternating-oﬀer bargaining model ￿ la Ru-
binstein, in which players sequentially propose a probability to play an agenda. Once
27players have agreed over such a probability, an agenda is selected with the accepted
probability and the two-stage bargaining game will start under the chosen agenda.
This is similar to Busch and Horstmann (1999)￿s game in which players bargain over
probabilities attached to diﬀerent bargaining procedures instead of agendas. As Busch
and Horstmann (1999) pointed out, this game represents bargaining over types of ar-
bitrator who will regulate the players￿ agenda. Each type of arbitrator is characterised
by a probability of setting an agenda. Once the type is chosen, this arbitrator will
de￿ne the agenda according to the probability which characterised him (for instance,
in some countries the owners of the ￿ats in a building need to agree on whom will
be the administrator, that is an individual or society which will regulate the meeting
among the owners over the issues regarding the maintenance of the building).
The in￿nitely repeated game is a deep modi￿cation of the pre-game structure,
however, obviously, it still re￿ects some of the characteristics of the subsequent sub-
game. For instance, in the case of complete symmetry (i.e., δi = δ, αi = α, λi = λ 6=1
for i =1 ,2), if the interval between a rejection and a new proposal, ∆,g o e st oz e r o ,
an agenda is selected with probability 1
2 in the unique SPE. The intuition is that
players prefer diﬀerent agendas but each of them can obtain an acceptance only by
proposing to toss a fair coin. When cake 1 is in￿nitely more important to player
1, λ1 →∞(or alternatively, λ2 →∞ ), the equilibrium probabilities are equal to
the Rubinsteinian shares (1/(1 + δ),δ/(1 + δ)). Player 1 prefers agenda 1, but he
28cannot do anything better than attaching the maximum probability to agenda 1 so
that player 2 accepts it, while player 2, who prefers agenda 2, proposes the minimum
probability of playing under agenda 1, so that his opponent accepts it.
In conclusion, in this section the agenda selection problem has been solved by
means of pre-games. The one-shot game in its soft version is strictly related to the
Pareto optimal agenda, while its tough version can be complementary to the analysis
of the comparative statics. Finally, the game ￿ la Rubinstein is interesting to describe
players￿ ability to set the agenda they prefer most. In the following, we consider a
possible modi￿cation of the bargaining game to include the possibility of diﬃcult
issues.
4 How to Deal with a Diﬃcult or Urgent Issue
In this section we assume that one issue is diﬃcult in the sense that a rejection of
a proposal regarding this issue may lead to the negotiations breaking down. For
instance, in a peace process there can be an issue characterised by this feature, simi-
larly, in the bargaining between a buyer and a seller there can be a diﬃcult item. In
these cases how should the agenda be set?
To investigate this case we modify the model described in section 2 in two ways.
First, we assume that there is no time lapse between bargaining stages (τ =0 ), this is
a simplifying assumption (the result below can be re-established when τ is positive).
29Second, the parameter α now represents the probability of game continuation after a
rejection of a proposal regarding the diﬃcult issue, say cake 1.I no t h e rw o r d sa f t e r
a rejection of a proposal regarding the division of cake 1, not only does the discount
factor δi apply but also the probability of game continuation α, while after a rejection
regarding the proposal of cake 2, only the discount factor δi applies. This does not
imply that cake 1 also represents the most important issue. The importance of an
issue still depends on the parameters λi with i =1 ,2 as in the model described in
section 2. When there is a rejection in the bargaining stage related to the division of
cake 1, it is as if players are characterised by a smaller discount factor, δiα (rather
than δi). In other words, cake 1 represents an urgent issue in the sense that the
bargaining round related to the division of cake 1 is longer than the bargaining round
in which players attempt to divide cake 2. Bearing in mind this double interpretation,
we derive the Pareto optimal agenda in the presence of a diﬃcult/urgent issue.
4.1 The Equilibrium Payoﬀs and the Optimal Agenda
Under agenda 1, in the second stage players play the Rubinsteinian game as in section
2, then the equilibrium demand (x1,y 2) at the ￿rst stage are given by the usual




λ1(1 − y2)+ 1−δ2
1−δ1δ2 = αδ1(x1λ1 +
(1−δ2)δ1
1−δ1δ2 )
1 − x1 + λ2
1−δ1




Therefore, the equilibrium payoﬀs to player i is indicated by vi with i =1 ,2,a s
follows,
v1 =
αδ2(λ1λ2(1 − δ1)(1 − αδ
2
2)+λ1(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − αδ2)+( 1− δ2)(δ1 − αδ2))
(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − α2δ1δ2)
(24)
v2 =
λ1λ2(1 − δ1)(δ2 − αδ1)+λ1(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − αδ1)+( 1− δ2)(1 − αδ
2
1)
λ1(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − α2δ1δ2)
(25)
Under agenda 2, where the agreement on cake 1 is represented by the Rubinsteinian
solution with discount factor αδi, the SPE equilibrium payoﬀs can be derived in the
same manner. Then, the equilibrium payoﬀ to player i is ui, described below for i =1
and 2 respectively,
λ1λ2(1 − αδ2)(αδ1 − δ2)+λ2(1 − α2δ1δ2)(1 − δ2)+( 1− αδ1)(1 − αδ
2
2))
λ2(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − α2δ1δ2)
(26)
δ2
λ1λ2(1 − αδ2)(1 − αδ
2
1)+λ2(1 − α2δ1δ2)(1 − δ1)+δ1(1 − αδ1)+αδ2(1 − αδ2)
(1 − δ1δ2)(1 − α2δ1δ2)
(27)
31To derive the Pareto optimal agenda we study the sign of the diﬀerences in players￿
payoﬀs under the two agendas vi−ui,w i t hi =1 ,2. Since in general these diﬀerences
are complicated functions of the parameters in the model, α, δi and λi with i =1 ,2,
we consider two simplifying cases. The ￿rst is the symmetry case, where players
have the same parameters, which implies that they have opposite preferences over
issues, unless λ =1 . In the second case, we assume that δi = α = a, for any i, but
there is agreement over the importance of the issues. The following two propositions
summarise the results. The proofs are in the appendix.
Proposition 5 When there is symmetry (i.e., δi = δ, λi = λ with i =1 ,2),t h e r e
exists an interval for λ, [λr2,λ r1],w i t hλri in (0,1),f o ri =1 ,2, where both players
prefer to discuss the more diﬃcult/urgent issue second. When λ does not belong to
[λr2,λ r1], players do not agree over agendas.
In general, players have diﬀerent preferences over agendas. However, when the
more diﬃcult issue is the more important to player 2, both players prefer to postpone
it - although only for a subinterval of λ ∈ (0,1). It is intuitive that player 1 prefers
agenda 2, since it puts his more important issue ￿rst, and the more urgent but also less
important second. Then, player 1 can ensure an agreement over his more important
issue, since his rival will be reluctant to reject a proposal. Why does player 2 prefer to
postpone his more important and urgent issue? One reason can be that player 2 can
ensure a ￿rst mover advantage over his relevant issue. However, as we show below,
32the driving force is that player 2 is better oﬀ in conceding over his important issue,
to enjoy the division of the easy issue ￿rst. To see this more clearly, let￿s assume that
there is consensus over the importance of the issues.
Proposition 6 When δi = α = a,f o ra n yi and there is consensus over the impor-
tance of the issue, the Pareto optimal agenda is the one in which the easy (or less
urgent issue) is discussed ￿rst.
Then, in general, players do not have the same preferences over agendas. However,
when they do, they prefer to postpone the discussion of the diﬃcult issue. This is
intuitive when the more diﬃcult issue is also the less important. In this case players
prefer to enjoy the agreement over the important and easy issue ￿rst. However,
players prefer to postpone a diﬃcult/urgent issue also when it is the most important,
as any rejection of the proposals regarding this issue are so costly that any further
bargaining may be precluded. This is consistent with the fact that in ￿rm-union
negotiations, the level of employment is discussed ￿rst, since it is considered ￿less
diﬃcult￿ than other issues.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In many bargaining situations the only available procedure is sequential (e.g., ne-
gotiations between a buyer and seller discussions in a departmental meeting, and
so on). To de￿ne how parties should select agendas, we investigated a two-person
33alternating-oﬀer model, where players diﬀer in terms of their time preferences and
valuations of the issues. In this model, the parameters interact in a complex way (the
common assumption of players with the same discount factor strongly simpli￿es the
interplay of the forces in the bargaining model). We identi￿ed three basic incentives
aﬀecting players preferences over agendas. A player prefers (1) to put his rival￿s more
important issue at the bottom of the list, (2) to discuss his more important issue ￿rst
and (3) to be the ￿rst mover in bargaining over his important issue. These incen-
tives can con￿ict. However, if there is consensus over the importance of the issues,
we showed that players prefer the agenda that puts the most important issue ￿rst.
When players have diﬀerent preferences over agendas, we solved the agenda selection
problem by means of pre-games. The two pre-games considered highlight diﬀerent
characteristics of the following bargaining game, since the solution of each pre-game
depends on which strategic eﬀects are dominant in the subsequent bargaining game.
Moreover, we showed that when there is an urgent/diﬃcult issue, in the sense that a
rejection of a proposal regarding this issue can compromise the negotiation process,
it is Pareto optimal to postpone such an issue. These are new ￿ndings in the agenda
formation problem from a game theoretical perspective.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5. From (24), (25), (26) and (27), we can derive vi−ui under
34symmetry. These diﬀerences are as follows,
v1 − u1 = q[λ
2(1 − δ)(1 − αδ












The diﬀerence v1 −u1 in (28) is an increasing function of λ, while v2 −u2 in (29) is a
decreasing function of λ.S i n c et h eu n i q u ep o s i t i v er o o to ft h ee q u a t i o nv1 − u1 =0
(named, λr1, see (30) below) is larger than the unique positive root of the equation
v2 − u2 =0(λr2) and both vary between 0,1 in the space αδin (0,1)2, then the
diﬀerences v1 − u1 and v2 − u2 have the same sign only when λ belong to [λr2,λ r1],
moreover the sign of these diﬀerence is negative.
λr1 =
δ(1 − α)(1 − δ +1− α)+
√
∆1




δ(1 − α)(1 + α − 2αδ)+
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Proof of Proposition 6. By using (24), (25), (26) and (27), the diﬀerences vi − ui
for i =1 ,2 when δi = α = a are as follows.
v1 − u1 = −g1[λ2(1 + λ1) − λ
2




v2 − u2 = −ag2{λ1λ2(1 + λ1)+a[−(1 + a) − a
2(1 + λ1)+ (35)
+λ1{a
2λ2(1 + λ1)+2 aλ1λ2 − 3a − 2+λ2}]}
where gi =[ λj(a +1 )
2(1 + α
2)]
−1with i,j =1 ,2 and i 6= j. (36)
These both have a negative sign, that is players prefer agenda 2, if λ2 belongs to [0,
36λ
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√
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